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COMMENTS
RESTRICTING THE INDIGENT'S RIGHT TO A TRANSCRIPT
United States v. MacCollom, 96 S. C. 2086 (1976)
A federal prisoner,' who failed to exercise his right of direct appeal,2
petitioned in forma pauperis for a transcript of his trial to aid him in
1. In 1970, Colin MacCollom was convicted of uttering forged currency in viola-
tion of 18 U.S.C. § 472 (1970), and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. United
States v. MacCollom, 96 S. Ct. 2086, 2089 (1976).
2. Under FED. R. APP. P. 4(b), MacCollom had ten days from the date of his
conviction to file notice of appeal. He took no steps to initiate the appeal process,
and the time for appeal had long since lapsed when the action was brought. 96 S. Ct.
at 2089.
3. In forma pauperis procedure allows defendants who cannot pay court costs
or post the security often required in court actions to proceed in spite of their indigence.
28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1970). In forma pauperis status is available at all levels of adju-
dication. It allows indigents access to appellate courts without facing the high costs
of appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 442-43 (1962). To qualify
for in forma pauperis status, the "litigant does not have to impoverish himself to the
extent that he and his dependents would become public charges." He must show that
the cost of court action will cause more than mere financial hardship. Martin v. Gulf
States Util. Co., 221 F. Supp. 757, 759 (W.D. La. 1963). See United States v. Pelle-
grini, 201 F. Supp. 65 (D. Mass. 1962).
Section 1915 requires the trial court to certify that the indigent's appeal is taken
in good faith prior to allowing an appeal in forma pauperis. The Supreme Court
has held that indigents demonstrate good faith within the meaning of the statute if
they present a nonfrivolous ground of appeal. Cf. Farley v. United States, 354 U.S.
521 (1957); Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S. 565 (1957). In Coppedge v. United
States, 369 U.S. 438, 447-48 (1962), the Court defined frivolous issues as those that
would be dismissed on motion by the government in appeals by nonindigent litigants.
Coppedge placed the burden on the government to show that an issue was frivolous.
Id. See also Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (per curiam) (pro se petitions
filed by indigent prisoners may not be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that
petitioner can prove no set of facts supporting his claim for relief). Additionally,
indigents are entitled to a transcript, or some appropriate substitute, and the assistance
of counsel to help demonstrate that they are entitled to appeal in forma pauperis.
See Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277 (1964) (transcript necessary to enable new
attorney to faithfully discharge obligations to represent client and "notice errors" as
required by FED. R. CalM. P. 52(b)); Ellis v. United States, 356 U.S. 674 (1958)
(indigents entitled to the effective assistance of counsel in search for nonfrivolous
issue); Johnson v. United States, 352 U.S. 565 (1957) (indigents have right to tran-
script and counsel to search for appealable nonfrivolous issue). Cf. Anders v. Cali-
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preparing a motion to vacate sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.- After
the clerk of the sentencing court denied his request,5 petitioner brought
an action to obtain a free transcript in federal district court,6 arguing
that he would otherwise be "unable to frame his arguments for fair and
effective review."7 The district court treated the transcript motion as
a section 2255 petition" and dismissed for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted.9 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit held that indigent federal prisoners proceeding in
forma pauperis are entitled to free transcripts for use in preparing sec-
tion 2255 motions. 10 The Supreme Court granted certiorari,'1 reversed,
and held: Neither due process nor equal protection entities an indigent
to a free transcript for use in a collateral attack on his conviction.' 2
Although the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
applies only to states, courts have held that the fifth amendment due
process clause imposes similar restrictions on the federal government.'3
Thus, while most cases discussing equal protection in the criminal jus-
fornia, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) (duties of counsel in indigent appeals). See generally
LaFrance, Criminal Defense Systems for the Poor, 50 No=ra DAmE LAw. 41 (1974);
Margolin & Wagner, The Indigent Criminal Defendant and Defense Services: A Search
for Constitutional Standards, 24 HASTINGS LJ. 647 (1973).
4. See note 34 infra and accompanying text.
5. The court clerk denied MacCollom's petition for a transcript on the ground
that he was powerless to act until MacCollom filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255
(1970), discussed in note 34 infra and accompanying text. United States v. MacCollom,
96 S. Ct. 2086, 2087 (1976).
6. MacCollom alleged that he "intend[ed] to move [the District] Court for vaca-
tion of his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255." 96 S. Ct. at 2089. MacCollom
argued that he could not afford a transcript, that a transcript would enable him to
show that he had been denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial, and that
there was insufficient evidence to support the guilty verdict. Id.
7. Id.
8. In treating the pro se petition as an action under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the court
acted in accord with FED. R. Cir. P. 8(f) and Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972),
which require district courts to interpret pro se petitions liberally and reframe them
if necessary to do substantial justice.
9. United States v. MacCollom, 96 S. Ct. 2086, 2089 (1976).
10. MacCollom v. United States, 511 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 96 S.
Ct. 2086 (1976). For discussion of the Ninth Circuit opinion see notes 41-43 infra
and accompanying text.
11. 423 U.S. 821 (1975).
12. United States v. MacCollom, 96 S. CL 2086 (1976).
13. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1959);. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24
(1948). See also note 18 infra.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1976/iss2/4
320 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1976:318
tice system have arisen in the context of state proceedings, the principles
developed in those cases apply equally to the federal government.
In Griffin v. Illinois,4 the Supreme Court held that the fourteenth
amendment requires a state to provide indigents with a free transcript
of their trials for use in direct criminal appeals.'r The Court reasoned
that all defendants are entitled to "'stand on an equality before the
bar of justice in every American court.' "16 Although states need not
provide any appellate review of criminal convictions, the fourteenth
amendment prohibits wealth-based discrimination in all proceedings the
state elects to establish. 17  While Griffin rested on both due process
and equal protection,' 8 the Warren Court subsequently emphasized the
14. 351 U.S. 12 (1956), noted in Allen, The Supreme Court and State Criminal
Justice, 4 WAYNE L. REv. 191 (1958); Hamley, The Impact of Griffin v. Illinois
on State Court-Federal Court Relationships, 24 F.R.D. 75 (1958); Schaefer, Federalism
and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HAv. L. REv. 1 (1956); Wilcox & Bloustein, The
Griffin Case-Poverty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 43 CORNELL LQ. 1 (1957);
9 ALA. L. REv. 354 (1957); 55 MicH. L. REv. 413 (1957); 17 Orno ST. L.J. 553 (1956);
30 S. CAL. L. REV. 350 (1957); 34 TEXAs L. REV. 1083 (1956); 4 U.C.L.A. L REv.
274 (1957); 10 VAND. L. REv. 141 (1956).
15. 351 U.S. at 19. The Illinois procedure attacked in Griffin gave every person
convicted in a criminal trial the right to direct appeal. Full appellate review was
possible, however, only if the appellate court was presented with a bill of exceptions
or a report of trial proceedings certified by the trial judge. Although preparation
of these documents often required a trial transcript, indigent defendants convicted of
noncapital offenses were not entitled to a free transcript. Id. at 13-14. The Court
ruled that this procedure, technically allowing review to indigents, in effect denied them
appellate relief because of their poverty. Accordingly, it violated both the due process
and equal protection clauses. Id. at 18.
16. Id. at 17, quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940).
17. 351 U.S. at 18.
18. Justice Black, author of the plurality opinion, emphasized duo process, arguing
that all persons were entitled to the same review of guilt:
Surely no one would contend that either a State or the Federal Government
could constitutionally provide that defendants unable to pay court costs in
advance should be denied the right to plead not guilty or defend themselves
in court.. . . Plainly the ability to pay costs in advance bears no rational
relationship to a defendant's guilt or innocence and could not be used as
an excuse to deprive a defendant of a fair trial....
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which effectively
denies the poor adequate appellate review accorded to all who have money
enough to pay the costs in advance.
Id. at 17-18 (footnote omitted). See also Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 359
(1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Under the plurality view, mere access to the appellate
system was a hollow procedural safeguard without the means to use the system effec-
tively to overturn an unjust conviction.
All of the States now provide some method of appeal from criminal con-
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equal protection component to extend the holding. In Smith v. Ben-
nett,19 the Court held that a state could not condition the right to
prosecute a collateral attack upon the payment of a filing fee. 0  In
victions, recognizing the importance of appellate review to a correct adjudica-
tion of guilt or innocence. Statistics show that a substantial proportion of
criminal convictions are reversed by state appellate courts. Thus to deny
adequate review to the poor means that many of them may lose their life,
liberty or property because of unjust convictions which appellate courts would
set aside.
351 U.S. at 18-19.
In a concurring opinion Justice Frankfurter noted that states could not condition
access to justice upon wealth:
when a State deems it wise and just that convictions be susceptible to review
by an appellate court, it cannot by force of its exactions draw a line which
precludes convicted indigent persons, forsooth erroneously convicted, from se-
curing such a review merely by disabling them from bringing to the notice
of an appellate tribunal errors of the trial court ....
id. at 23. See also Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 257 (1959).
A comparison of the majority and concurring opinions reveals that Justice Black's
due process analysis and Justice Frankfurter's equal protection analysis are very
similar. Compare 351 U.S. at 17-18 (Black, J.) ("Plainly the ability to pay costs
in advance bears no rational relationship to a defendant's guilt or innocence . . ."),
with id. at 22 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (Court cannot sanction "differentiations
by a State that have no relation to a rational policy of criminal appeal . .. ).
Each position rests on the assumption that all persons accused of a crime must "stand
on an equality before the bar of justice in every American court," Chambers v. Florida,
309 U.S. 227, 241 (1940), and each recognizes that due process and equal protection
spring from a common source, the "American ideal of fairness." Bolling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). See Wilson, The Merging Concepts of Liberty and Equal-
ity, 12 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 182 (1955).
The Griffin equal protection analysis has been equally useful in requiring the federal
government to provide indigents transcripts of their federal criminal proceedings. Sev-
eral cases, including MacCollom, have implicitly adopted the reasoning of Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (companion case to Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954)), and Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948) (companion case to Shelley
v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)), which held that principles of equal protection, though
not expressly applicable to federal action under the fourteenth amendment, are implicit
in the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,
499. See, e.g., Benthiem v. United States, 403 F.2d 1009 (1st Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 945 (1970); United States v. Shoaf, 341 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1964); Bozeman
v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 1262 (E.D. Va. 1973).
19. 365 U.S. 708 (1961).
20. I. at 713-14. In Smith, indigent state prisoners were required to pay a four-
dollar filing fee before the state courts would hear their habeas corpus petitions. The
iequirement violated equal protection:
The gist of [Griffin] is that because "[there is no rational basis for assuming
that [any petition filed by an indigent] will be less meritorious than those of
other defendants, . . . [tihere can be no equal justice where the kind of trial
a man gets depends on the amount of money he has."
I. at 710, quoting Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1959), and Griffin v. Illinois,
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1976/iss2/4
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Long v. District Court21 and Lane v. Brown,22 the Court held that
indigents appealing the denial of a petition for collateral relief are con-
stitutionally entitled to a free transcript of the collateral proceedings.2"
A trial judge's determination that an appeal would not promote
justice24 or would be frivolous 25 was insufficient ground for denying
a transcript. Finally, in Douglas v. California,20 the Warren Court
again relied on Griffin's equal protection component to hold that states
must provide indigents with counsel on a direct appeal of right. 7
351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956). See also Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959) (applying
Griffin to overturn filing fees required for a discretionary state appeal).
21. 385 U.S. 192 (1966) (per curiam).
22. 372 U.S. 477 (1963) (right to transcript in appeal from denial of state coram
nobis petition).
23. Id. at 478 (state coram nobis proceeding). The Lane Court emphasized that
the Griffin rule was applicable to any phase of appellate procedure afforded by the
state. Id. at 483-84. See also Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367 (1969) (state
habeas corpus).
24. Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. of Prison Terms & Paroles, 357 U.S. 214
(1958) (per curiam). In Eskridge, the Court held unconstitutional a Washington stat-
ute that required the court to furnish indigents with a transcript for direct appeal
only if in the trial judge's opinion "justice [would] thereby be promoted." Id. at
215. The Court reasoned that a trial judge's conclusion that no reversible error had
occurred was an inadequate substitute for appellate review of the record. Id. at 216.
25. Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963). Under procedures adopted after
Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. of Prison Terms & Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958),
see note 24 supra, indigent defendants in Washington who desired a transcript for
use on direct appeal were entitled to a copy of trial records only if the trial judge
determined that the claims presented were not frivolous. 372 U.S. at 498. The Supreme
Court, relying heavily on Eskridge and Griffin, held that a trial judge's determination
that an appeal was frivolous was an inadequate substitute for appellate review. The
Court also held that an indigent was entitled to "'a record of sufficient completeness'
to permit proper consideration of [his] claims." Id. at 499, quoting Coppedge v.
United States, 369 U.S. 438, 446 (1962).
26. 372U.S. 353 (1963).
27. The California procedure challenged in Douglas required state appellate courts
to independently investigate the trial record before appointing counsel to represent indi-
gent criminal defendants in their only appeal of right. Counsel would be appointed if
the reviewing court felt that it would be advantageous to either the court or the defend-
ant. Id. at 355, quoting People v. Hyde, 51 Cal. 2d 152, 331 P.2d 42, 43 (1958).
The Court found that this system conditioned an effective appeal on a person's
ability to pay for counsel. Indigents lacking counsel were forced to go forward
with only the barren record; courts were forced to prejudge the merits of his case
prior to the appointment of counsel. Such an arrangement was anathema to due
process. The Court also held that the California procedure violated equal protection.
The present case, where counsel was denied petitioners on appeal, shows that
the discrimination is not between "possibly good and obviously bad cases,"
Washington University Open Scholarship
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In Ross v. Moffitt,28 the Burger Court reconsidered the equal protec-
tion principles underlying Griffin and refused to extend Douglas. Ross
held that indigents prosecuting discretionary appeals are not entitled to
assistance of appointed counsel. 9 The Court reasoned that equal
protection does not require absolute equality in all phases of the criminal
justice system;3" the state must afford indigents no more than an initial
opportunity to present their claims fully and fairly,3' and maintain
but between cases where the rich man can require the court to listen to argu-
ment of counsel before deciding on the merits, but a poor man cannot.
Id. at 357.
The Court's conclusion in Douglas shows how closely due process and equal protec-
tion intermesh:
There is lacking [in the California procedure] that equality demanded by
the Fourteenth Amendment where the rich man, who appeals as of right,
enjoys the benefit of counsel's examination into the record, research of the
law, and marshalling of arguments on his behalf, while the indigent, already
burdened by a preliminary determination that his case is without merit, is
forced to shift for himself. The indigent, where the record is unclear or
the errors are hidden, has only the right to a meaningless ritual, while the
rich man has a meaningful appeal.
Id. at 357-58.
28. 417 U.S. 600 (1974), noted in 60 A.B.A.J. 956 (1974); 36 LA. L. Rav. 297
(1975); 35 MD. L. REv. 134 (1975); 53 N.C.L. REv. 560 (1975); 29 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 153 (1974); 9 U. RIcHMOND L. REV. 369 (1975); 14 WAsI-nuRN L.J. 650 (1975).
See also Note, Ross v. Moffitt: The End of the Griffin-Douglas Line, 24 CATH-. U.L
REV. 314 (1975); Note, Appellate Representation of Indigents in Indiana, 50 IND.
L.J. 154 (1974).
29. 417 U.S. at 619. In Ross, the petitioner, an indigent convicted of forgery,
was represented by court-appointed counsel at trial and on an appeal of right before
the state intermediate appellate court, which affirmed his conviction. Id. at 603. Under
applicable state law, an appeal to the state supreme court would lie only if the case
involved a matter of significant public interest, legal principles of major significance
to state law, or a probable conflict between a decision by the supreme court and the
certified decision of the court of appeals. Id. at 613-14, quoting N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 7A-31 (c) (1969). The United States Supreme Court held that the Constitution
does not require the appointment of counsel during the certification process, reasoning
that indigents completing a direct appeal of right in the state court of appeals would
be armed with the transcript of their trial, the appellate brief, and, in many cases,
an opinion disposing of the case. Id. at 614-15. These materials, together with any
supplemental material submitted by the prisoner on his own behalf, would be sufficient
to enable the state supreme court to determine whether the case fit within the statutory
certification standards. Id.
30. Id. at 612, quoting San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 1, 24 (1973).
31. Id. The Court emphasized that states cannot adopt procedures which cut off
indigents "from any appeal at all," id., quoting Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 481
(1963), discussed in note 22 supra and accompanying text, or grant indigents a "mean-
ingless ritual" while affluent defendants receive a "meaningful appeal." Id., quoting
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963), discussed in notes 26-27 supra and
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1976/iss2/4
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later phases of appellate review free from unreasoned distinctions "
Ross received a fair opportunity to present his claims on direct appeal,
when he had the benefit of a transcript and counsel. The state was not
required to provide counsel for subsequent discretionary appeals. 3
Section 225534 is a collateral review statute that enables federal
prisoners to challenge the constitutionality of their sentences.", Sec-
accompanying text. The regulations limiting access to discretionary appeal had neither
effect and therefore did not violate equal protection. The Court stated:
The duty of the State under our cases is not to duplicate the legal arsenal
that may be privately retained by a criminal defendant in a continuing effort
to reverse his conviction, but only to assure the indigent defendant an adequate
opportunity to present his claims fairly in the context of the State's appellate
process.
id. at 616.
32. Id. at 612, quoting Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310 (1966).
33. In Ross, appointed counsel represented the petitioner before the intermediate
appellate court. Id. at 603. The state apparently supplied him with a transcript as
well. Id. at 615. Thus, he was afforded a full opportunity to present his claim.
34. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970).
35. Subject matter jurisdiction under § 2255 is limited to persons in federal custody
asserting certain kinds of claims. Prisoners may use § 2255 only to challenge
their sentences
upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitu-
tion or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction
to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum
authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack ....
28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970). See Lee v. United States, 501 F.2d 494, 500 (8th Cir.
1974); Tanner v. Moseley, 441 F.2d 122 (8th Cir. 1971). Section 2255 prohibits
prisoners from using habeas corpus to attack the constitutionality of their confinement
unless a § 2255 action will be "inadequate or ineffective" to test the sentence's con-
stitutional validity. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970). It is unclear from the case law whether
failure to issue a free transcript to an indigent seeking § 2255 relief renders a §
2255 proceeding inadequate to challenge the validity of the sentence.
There is no constitutional right to counsel in either state or federal posteonviction
relief proceedings. See United States v. Parman, 461 F.2d 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (per
curiam) (no right to counsel in § 2255 proceeding); Miranda v. United States, 455
F.2d 402 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972); Day v. United States, 428
F.2d 1193 (8th Cir. 1970) (no right to counsel in review of § 2255 proceeding);
Abraham v. Wainwright, 407 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1969) (no right to counsel in state
postconviction relief proceeding); Gallegos v. Turner, 386 F.2d 440 (10th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1045 (1968) (no right to counsel in state habeas corpus proceed-
ing); LaClair v. United States, 374 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1967) (appointment of counsel
in habeas corpus and postconviction relief proceedings is discretionary); Fleming v.
United States, 365 F.2d 587 (1st Cir. 1966) (appointment of counsel is discretionary
in matters other than direct appeal); Putt v. United States, 363 F.2d 369 (5th Cir.
1966) (per curiam), rehearing denied, 392 F.2d 64 (1968) (counsel not required in
motion for relief from sentence); Dirring v. United States, 353 F.2d 519 (1st Cir.
Washington University Open Scholarship
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tion 753 (f) of the Court Reporter Act,36 which regulates the issuance
of free transcripts to indigent federal prisoners pursuing collateral at-
tacks, grants a free transcript to indigent petitioners proceeding under
section 2255 only if the trial judge certifies that the action is not frivo-
lous and that a transcript is necessary to decide the issue presented. 37
Prior to the Ninth Circuit decision in MacCollom,38 lower federal courts
uniformly held that this restriction violated neither due process nor
1965) (counsel not required in post-appeal new trial motion); Robison v. United
States, 329 F.2d 156 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 859 (1964) (no right to counsel
on appeal from denial of § 2255 motion); United States v. Visconti, 261 F.2d 215
(2d Cir 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 954 (1959) (no right to counsel on appeal from
denial of motion for reduction of sentence).
36. 28 U.S.C. § 753 (1970). The Act regulates the content and production of
transcripts in federal courts and prescribes the duties of court reporters.
37. Section 753(f) provides:
Fees for transcripts furnished in criminal proceedings to persons proceeding
under the Criminal Justice Act (18 U.S.C. 3006A), or in habeas corpus pro-
ceedings to persons allowed to sue, defend, or appeal in forma pauperis, shall
be paid by the United States. . . . Fees for transcripts furnished in proceed-
ings brought under [28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970)] shall be paid by the United
States . . . if the trial judge or a circuit judge certifies that the suit or
appeal is not frivolous and that the transcript is needed to decide the issue
presented by the suit or appeal.
Prior to the adoption of the current § 753(f), it was unclear whether federal courts
had power to issue free transcripts in § 2255 cases. Compare United States v.
Stevens, 224 F.2d 866 (3d Cir. 1955) (courts had no power to issue free tran-
scripts in 2255 cases), with United States v. Glass, 317 F.2d 200 (4th Cir. 1963)
(earlier version of § 753(f) conferred power to issue transcripts to § 2255 petitioners
after they showed that transcript would be useful). See Sokol, The Availability of
7 anvciipi for Fcderal Prisoners, 2 AM. CIM. L.Q. 63, 63-67 (1964).
The legislative history of the 1965 version of § 753(f) contains no specific justifica-
tion for the certification requirements. In a letter to the Senate, Deputy Attorney
General Clark stated:
The reason for this distinction [in certification requirements] is not apparent
if the motion remedy under section 2255 is to be a remedy commensurate
with the writ of habeas corpus.
Letter from Deputy Attorney General Clark to Senate Judiciary Committee, May 27,
1964, reprinted in S. REP. No. 617, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1965). Despite Clark's
letter, the committee gave the distinction little, if any, consideration. See Blackmun,
Allowance of In Forma Pauperis Appeals in § 2255 and Habeas Corpus Cases, 43
F.R.D. 343, 357 (1967).
When the Judicial Conference initially considered § 2255, it rejected as a possible
justification for certification that it prevents prisoners from filing baseless motions in
order to receive a "joy ride" away from prison at government expense. See United
States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 217 n.25 (1952).
38 MacCollom v. United States, 511 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 96 S.
Ct. 2086 (1976).
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equal protection. In Wade v. Wilson,4 ° the Supreme Court expressly
refused to decide whether indigents prosecuting collateral attacks are
39. These courts held that § 753 does not mandate issuance of a transcript unless
the indigent could demonstrate a "particularized need" for some or all of the rec-
ord. United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 1169 (4th Cir. 1976); Jones v. Superintendent,
460 F.2d 150, 152 (4th Cir.), rehearing denied, 465 F.2d 1091 (1972), cert. denied,
410 U.S. 944 (1973); Ellis v. Maine, 448 F.2d 1325, 1327 (1st Cir. 1971); Hines
v. Baker, 422 F.2d 1002, 1006 (10th Cir. 1970); Benthiem v. United States, 403 F.2d
1009, 1011 n.5 (1st Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 945 (1970); McGarry v. Fogliani,
370 F.2d 42, 44 (9th Cir. 1966) (per curiam); United States v. Shoaf, 341 F.2d
832, 835-36 (4th Cir. 1964); Harris v. Nebraska, 320 F. Supp. 100, 104 (D. Neb.
1970); United States v. Wiley, 238 F. Supp. 1008, 1010 (D.D.C. 1965). Cf. United
States ex rel Buford v. Henderson, 524 F.2d 147 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 96
S. Ct. 1133 (1976). Some courts, however, have omitted mention of the requirement,
possibly indicating its rejection. See, e.g., Pate v. Holman, 341 F.2d 764, 768-69 (5th
Cir. 1965) (failure to provide a transcript for use on appeal may give rise to habeas
corpus claim).
The standard of need that indigents must meet has been variously stated. See Pol-
lard v. Kidd, 383 F. Supp. 1056, 1058 (E.D. Va. 1974). The First Circuit defined
the standard in Ellis v. Maine, 448 F.2d 1325, 1327 (1st Cir. 1971):
Appellants petition is wholly for collateral relief. . . . inhere should be
a burden on the petitioner to come into court with his case, not simply to
try to make one out. This does not mean . . . with his full case, but he
must show merit, not just personal opinion.
Id. at 1327.
In Bozeman v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 1262 (E.D. Va. 1973), the court held
that to be entitled to a transcript, an indigent must attack elements of his conviction
that "were transcribed and that can be reviewed only on the basis of a transcript."
Additionally, he must state a claim of "constitutional dimensions [which is] neither
frivolous on its face nor rendered moot under law by other applicable doctrines" and
specify the questionable portions of the proceedings with sufficient clarity to permit
a court to make an initial determination of relevance. Id. at 1264.
Other courts have been less specific. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 443 F.2d
659 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (prisoner must show specific prejudice caused by
lack of transcript); Brown v. United States, 438 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam)
(government need not provide free transcript where postconviction motion does not
set forth grounds of attack on sentence); Grace v. Dillow, 296 F. Supp. 311 (E.D.
Tenn. 1968) (prisoner must challenge sufficiency of evidence adduced at trial before
free transcript will be granted).
Courts have advanced several justifications for the "particularized need" rule. In
United States v. Shoaf, 341 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1964), Judge Haynsworth reasoned
that the usual grounds for a successful collateral attack on a criminal conviction are
events, occurring either inside or outside the courtroom, which the defendant can recall
without resort to a transcript. An indigent would rarely, if ever, need a transcript
to discover grounds for collateral relief. Id. at 835.
In Aubut v. Maine, 431 F.2d 688, 689 (1st Cir. 1970), Judge Aldrich held that
absent the requirement that a petition for collateral relief set out more than an unde-
tailed allegation of error or deprivation of rights, courts would be inundated with friv-
olous requests, since every prisoner could obtain a hearing by filing a complaint com-
posed of generalizations and conclusions. See also Bozeman v. United States, 354
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automatically entitled to a free transcript.4 Nevertheless, in the opinion
of the Ninth Circuit, Griffin and its progeny prohibited the imposition
of any restrictions on the right to a transcript. 42 The court did not hold
section 753(f) unconstitutional, however, because it concluded that
the statute did not bar immediate issuance of a transcript to an indigent
who, as in the instant case, requested one prior to asserting a section
2255 claim.43
In United States v. MacCollom,44 the Supreme Court disagreed with
F. Supp. 1262, 1262-64 (E.D. Va. 1973) ("particularized need" rule necessary to deter-
mine whether an indigent needed the whole transcript or only a portion to support his
claims).
The "particularized need" rule underlies those decisions holding that indigents have
no right to a free transcript merely "to comb the record in search of a flaw." See
United States v. Herrera, 474 F.2d 1049 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 861 (1974); United States ex rel. Nunes v. Nelson, 467 F.2d 1380, 1380-
81 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam); Doyal v. United States, 456 F.2d 1292, 1293 (5th
Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 870 (1972); Bentley v. United States, 431
F.2d 250, 254 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 920 (1971); United States v.
Glass, 317 F.2d 200, 202 (4th Cir. 1963). Cf. Weathers v. United States, 322 F.
Supp. 602 (D.S.C. 1970) (prisoner who had evidentiary hearing on merits of collateral
claim not entitled to transcript to search for new grounds).
In a series of cases prior to MacCollom, the Ninth Circuit adhered to the "particu-
larized need" standard. See United States ex rel. Nunes v. Nelson, 467 F.2d 1380,
1380-81 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam); Wilson v. Wade, 390 F.2d 632, 634 (9th Cir.
1968), vacated and remanded, 396 U.S. 282 (1970); McGarry v. Fogliani, 370 F.2d
42, 44 (9th Cir. 1966) (per curian); Brown v. United States, 270 F.2d 80 (9th Cir.
1959) (per curiam). But cf. Doyle v. United States, 366 F.2d 394, 399 (9th Cir.
1966):
When a defendant is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis, he must
be furnished . . . a sufficient record to make manifest the basis of his claim
of error.
40. 396 U.S. 282 (1970).
41. Id. at 286.
42. MacCollom v. United States, 511 F.2d 1116, 1117 (9th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 96
S. Ct, 2086 (1976).
43. Id. at 1119, 1124. The Ninth Circuit held that 28 U.S.C. § 753(f) (1970),
see notes 35-36 supra, did not forbid courts from requiring the government to supply
indigents with transcripts before they filed a § 2255 motion. The court thought
this construction "would fill a constitutional deficit not addressed by the statute."
Id. at 1119-20. Under the Ninth Circuit's approach the timing of a petition was
crucial. Indigents who sought a transcript for use in preparation of a § 2255 motion
were entitled to receive one free, since § 753(f) did not provide for this contingency.
Indigents who initially filed a § 2255 motion, however, would still be required to
show nonfrivolity, since the statute expressly covered such an event.
44, United States v. MacCollom, 96 S. Ct. 2086 (1970). Before proceeding to
the main issues, the Court quickly disposed of two preliminary matters: the effect
of the Ninth Circuit's opinion on the expenditure of public funds, and the effect of
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the Ninth Circuit's interpretation and held that the frivolity provisions
of section 753 (f) violated neither due process nor equal protection.
The Court relied heavily on Ross, reasoning that equal protection re-
quires only that indigents be given a fair opportunity to present their
claims, 45 not "absolute equality or precisely equal advantages. 'a  Al-
though MacCollom would have received a free transcript 47 had he
§ 753(f) on the constitutional right to habeas corpus. The Court noted that
the Ninth Circuit opinion, which allowed public funds to be expended on transcript
production except when prohibited by statute, see note 41 supra, was inconsistent with
the established rule that:
Where Congress has addressed the subject as it has here, and authorized ex-
penditures where a condition is met, the clear implication is that where the
condition is not met, the expenditure is not authorized. Botany Worsted Mills
v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 289 (1929); Passenger Corp. v. Passenger
Assn., 414 U.S. 453, 458 (1974).
Unfortunately, the Court failed to consider 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1970). Section
1915(a) allows indigents to prosecute all civil, criminal, and appellate actions in forma
pauperis; section 1915(b) specifically authorizes production of court records at govern-
ment expense. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (1970) (monies spent by government
to purchase transcript for indigent are taxable against him as costs if he prevails);
Whitt v. United States, 259 F.2d 158 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (power to order transcripts
is inherent in § 1915); Young v. United States, 246 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1957) (§
1915 allows courts to order transcripts); Parsell v. United States, 218 F.2d 232 (5th
Cir. 1955) (courts may rely on § 1915 as authority to issue free transcripts). Thus,
despite the Supreme Court's assertion to the contrary, there is ample authority for
the Ninth Circuit's holding in MacCollom.
The Court also ruled that the frivolity requirements in § 753(f) do not con-
stitute a suspension of the right of habeas corpus in violation of article I, § 9 of
the Constitution. In reaching this conclusion, the Court asserted that access to a
transcript is not a "necessary concommitant" of the right to habeas corpus, 96 S.
Ct. at 2090; Congress can limit use of a transcript as it sees fit, even to the extent
of imposing differing regulations on the access of indigent habeas corpus and §
2255 prisoners to transcripts. Id. at 2090-91.
45. 96 S. Ct. at 2091, quoting Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 616 (1974).
46. 96 S. Ct. at 2091, quoting San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1, 24 (1973).
47. Respondent in this case had an opportunity for direct appeal, and had
he chosen to pursue it he would have been furnished a free transcript of
the trial proceedings.
96 S. Ct. at 2091. In the same paragraph, the Court also indicated that MacCollom
would have been entitled to the assistance of counsel on direct appeal. Id., citing
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). MacCollom's failure to exercise his right
of direct appeal is crucial to the majority's decision; it is discussed five times during
the course of the opinion. On four occasions, Justice Rehnquist noted that MacCollom
would have had an adequate opportunity to attack his conviction on direct appeal; he
now had to accept the consequences of his decision. See, e.g., 96 S. Ct. at 2091. In
a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun, insisted that MacCollom's failure to prosecute
" direct appeal was irrelevant to the decision. Id, at 2093-94. See ahzo note 58 infra,
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exercised his statutory right of direct appeal,48 his failure to do so
resulted in a waiver of the right to receive a free transcript on demand.49
The frivolity provisions of section 753(f) "comported with fair pro-
cedure"" and thus satisfied due process.51 The Court found no viola-
tion of equal protection because unlike mandatory filing fees,52 the
section 753(f) restrictions did not make access to section 2255 pro-
ceedings impossible." Finally, the Court noted that because success-
ful collateral attacks are usually based on events not shown in the
48. The Court emphasized that there is no constitutional right to a direct appeal.
96 S. Ct. at 2091, citing Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956). See notes 14-17
supia; note 69 infia.
49. Neither due process nor equal protection required the government to provide
indigcnts with such a delayed right:
Having foregone this right [to a direct appeal], . . . he may not several
years later successfully assert a due process right to review of his conviction
and thereby obtain a free transcript on his own terms as an ancillary constitu-
tional benefit.
96 S. Ct. at 2091.
Equal protection does not require the Government to furnish to the indigent
a delayed duplicate right of appeal with attendant free transcript ....
Id at 2092.
50. Id. at 2091, quoting Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963).
51. The conditions which Congress had imposed on obtaining [a transcript
for use in § 2255] in § 753(f) are not "so arbitrary and unreasonable as
to require their invalidation. .. "
96 S Ct. at 2091, quoting Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 365 (1963) (Harlan,
J., dissenting).
52. The Court has held that when a State grants a right to collateral re-
view, it may not deny the right to an indigent simply because of inability
to pay the required filing fee, Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 81 S. Ct.
895, 6 L Ed. 2d 39 (1961). There is no such impediment here; respondent
was permitted to proceed in forma pauperis in his § 2255 action.
96 S. Ct. at 2091.
53. According to the majority, the basic question was whether MacCollom received
an adequate opportunity to seek review of his conviction. 96 S. Ct. at 2092. The
majority concluded:
the fact that a transcript was available and respondent chose to appeal from
his conviction, and remained available on the conditions set forth in § 753(f)
to an indigent proceeding under § 2255, afforded respondent an adequate
opportunity to attack his conviction.
Id. at 2093. Since equal protection does not require absolute equality, id. at 2091,
citing San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24 (1973),
the inequalities created by § 753(f) do not violate equal protection.
The equal protection standard adopted by the Supreme Court conflicts with that
adopted by the Ninth Circuit, which held that indigents are entitled to the same level
of assistance as "wealthy defendants." MacCollom v. United States, 511 F.2d 1116,
1122 (9th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 96 S. Ct. 2086 (1976). See also notes 79-81 infra and
accompanying text.
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transcript,54 the inequality resulting from denial of a free transcript on
demand would be minimal."5
Justice Brennan dissented vigorously,"' arguing that MacCollom was
a "plain departure" from Griffin." Equal protection requires that an
indigent's opportunity to present his claims be commensurate with that
afforded an affluent defendant in any proceeding centering on the
validity of criminal confinement."' MacCollom's failure to prosecute
a direct appeal was irrelevant.59 Under Griffin and its progeny, indi-
gents are entitled to a transcript in any procedure to challenge a criminal
conviction;60 all distinctions between indigents and affluent defendants,
54. 96 S. Ct. at 2093. The majority adopted this argument from Judge Hayns-
worth's opinion in United States v. Shoaf, 341 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1964), discussed in
note 39 supra. The Ninth Circuit had rejected the Shoal rationale, noting:
Assuming that the "usual" grounds for collateral relief do involve either
events outside the courtroom or events inside the courtroom which some de-
fendants might recall without the aid of a transcript-and we are aware of
no empirical study to support this assumption-we have no reason to know
whether a particular transcript would contain a basis for collateral attack,
not obvious to a layman with even a good memory. No one has seen Mae-
Collom's trial transcript, and some statistical probability concerning the con-
tent of most trial transcripts seems a poor reason to deny MacCollom access
to his own.
MacCollom v. United States, 511 F.2d 1116, 1122 (9th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 96 S. Ct.
2086 (1976) (footnote omitted).
55. 96 S. Ct. at 2093, citing United States v. Shoaf, 341 F.2d 832, 835 (4th Cir.
1964).
56. 96 S. Ct. at 2094. Justice Marshall joined in Justice Brennan's dissent.
57. Id. Justice Brennan stated:
The Constitution demands that respondent, despite his indigency, be afforded
the same opportunity for collateral review of his conviction as the nonindigent.
Id. at 2095 (footnote omitted). Earlier, the dissent noted that "differences in access
to the instruments needed to vindicate legal rights, when based upon the financial
situation of the defendant, are repugnant to the Constitution." Id. at 2094, quoting
Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40, 42 (1967).
58. 96 S. Ct. at 2096.
59. Justice Brennan rejected the majority's argument that MacCollom could be de-
nied access to a transcript because he failed to prosecute a direct apeal. See note
49 supra and accompanying text.
It bears emphasis that where, as here, denial of equal protection is the
issue, it matters not, under our cases that the indigent had a fair opportunity
to present a defense and have his conviction reviewed on direct appeal.
96 S. Ct. at 2095.
60. According to the dissent, Griffin and its progeny permit no distinction between
trials, collateral review, and direct appeals. Id. at 2096. See also id. at 2094-95
(describing expansion of Griffin line). Justice Brennan also found the distinction ir-
reconcilable with the explicit constitutional recognition of the role of habeas corpus. Id.
at 2096, citing Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399-403 (1963). Under this view, since
the scope of the § 2255 remedy is coextensive with that of habeas corpus, the
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whether on direct appeal or collateral attack, are intolerable.6"
Despite lip service to the Warren Court precedents, 62 MacCollom
and Ross embody a fundamentally different conception of equal pro-
tection in criminal justice. Griffin, Smith, and Dougls63 proscribed
any wealth-based distinctions in state proceedings to challenge a criminal
conviction.6" This standard implied that the equal protection clause
imposed an affirmative duty upon the states to provide indigents with all
services available to affluent defendants.65 Ross and MacCollom reject
this concept of equal protection. The government is no longer obli-
gated to provide indigents with all services available to their wealthy
counterparts, or to compensate for natural disadvantages. Because equal
proceeding was entitled to equal constitutional importance. Id., quoting Davis v. United
States, 417 U.S. 333, 343 (1974).
61. 96 S. Ct. at 2096 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall, also dissented, ar-
guing that the majority had created a frivolity standard incapable of fair and uniform
application by the district courts. Id. at 2097 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Additionally,
Justice Stevens noted that in many cases judges would be unable to determine whether
a petitioner's claims were frivolous without first having a transcript for his own use.
Id. Immediate production of transcripts would eliminate "a serious cause of delay
in the processing of criminal appeals." and speed the incarceration of guilty prisoners.
Id. at 2098 & n.7. Justice Stevens thought any budgetary impact caused by such a
policy would be minimal, id. at 2098 n.8, and outweighed by savings in one of the
"Nation's scarcest resources": judicial time. Id. at 2098.
Finally, Justice Stevens argued that the precise issues presented by the case could
have been disposed of, and the constitutional issues avoided, if the majority opinion
had defined the term frivolity in § 753(f) and proceeded no further. Id. at 2097
n.2. Under Justice Stevens' view of the statute, indigents who pass the hurdle of
frikolity imposed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1970), see note 3 supra, also pass the hurdle
imposed by § 753(f). Accordingly, transcripts would be issued in all cases where
the indigent presented issues that could not be dismissed on motion of the government
in actions by non-indigents. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962),
discussed in note 3 supra; Note, The Indigent's Right to a Transcript of Record, 20
KAN. L. REv. 745, 762 (1972). See also Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1971),
discussed in note 3 supra.
62. See United States v. MacCollom, 96 S. Ct. 2086, 2091-92 (1976); Ross v.
Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 611-12 (1974).
63. See notes 14-19 & 26-27 supra and accompanying text.
64. See Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1963), discussed in note 22 supra
and accompanying text; Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 713-14 (1961), -discussed
In notes 19-20 supra and accompanying text; Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 257 (1959).
65. MacCollom v. United States, 511 F.2d 1116, 1122 (9th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 96
S. Ct. 2086 (1976) (comparing services provided indigent under "particularized need"
rule with those provided for his "wealthy cellmate"); 35 MD. L. REv. 134, 143-44,
144 n.69 (1975). But see Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 361-62 (1963) (Harlan,
J., dissenting) (equal protection does not require states to equalize economic conditions
but only to treat its citizens equally).
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protection is measured by "adequacy," rather than equality, the govern-
ment need only afford indigents a minimum quantity of procedural
rights. For the Burger Court, a full and fair opportunity to present
one's claims satisfies this minimum. 6
The logical conclusion of this approach is to define equal protection
solely in terms of due process. If a criminal justice system provides the
requisite due process rights, there is no equal protection violation. If the
government does violate equal protection, it does so only by failing to
provide due process. Equal protection thus becomes irrelevant to
criminal justice; the sole question is whether due process is satisfied. 7
MacCollom and Ross held that a fair trial and one direct appeal of
right provide an indigent with a full and fair opportunity to present his
claims and thereby satisfy due process."' The Court insisted in both
66. See United States v. MacCollom, 96 S. Ct. 2086, 2091 (1976), quoting Ross
v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 616 (1974). Under the Ross-MacCollom standard, the key
issue is one of fairness; if the state provides an indigent with a fair opportunity to
present his claims, there is no violation of equal protection. On the other hand, unfair-
ness results only if indigents are singled out by the state and denied meaningful access
to the appellate system because of their poverty. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 611
(1974). Although neither Ross nor MacCollom adequately defines "meaningful access,"
it may mean that "a State cannot arbitrarily cut off appeal rights for indigents while
leaving open avenues of appeal for more affluent persons." ld. at 607.
67. This appears to be a vindication of Justice Harlan's view that whether due
process has been satisfied is the only appropriate question in the transcript-counsel
cases. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 363 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting):
The real question in this case ... and the only one that admits of satis-
factory analysis, is whether or not the state rule ... is consistent with the
requirements of fair procedure guaranteed by the Due Process Clause.
See also Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 29 (1956) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (Illinois
procedure did not arbitrarily or capriciously deny the right to appeal); 35 MD. L.
R v. 134, 145-46 (1975) (due process analysis used in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963), should be applied to transcript cases).
68. United States v. MacCollom, 96 S. Ct. 2086, 2091 (1976); Ross v. Moffitt,
417 U.S. 600, 614-15 (1974).
While the two decisions fail to offer explicit reasons for this conclusion, several
arguments have been made to support it. First, because a direct appeal provides review
of both factual and legal issues, Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 177 (1947), it is the
most appropriate forum for reexamination of a trial court's determination of guilt or
innocence. The crucial role of the direct appeal has been underscored in numerous
discussions of the propriety of upsetting an affirmed conviction through the use of
habeas corpus. See Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 3044-45 (1976); Schneckloth
v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 250-66 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring); Kaufman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 217, 242 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting); Amsterdam, Search,
Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. PA. L REV. 378 (1964); Friendly,
Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Cm L.
REv. 142, 148 (1970) (arguing that since habeas corpus produces "no result in tho
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cases that nothing in the due process clause requires the government to
provide any appeal." If a direct appeal is not a prerequisite to a "full
and fair opportunity to present claims," the government would ordinarily
oveiwhelming majority of cases," its use should be strongly limited). Lower federal
courts have held that § 2255 is not an adequate substitute for appeal. See, e.g.,
United States v. Durhart, 511 F.2d 7 (6th Cir. 1975); Garcia v. United States, 492
F.2d 395 (10th Cir. 1974); Peterson v. United States, 467 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 933 (1973); Levine v. United States, 430 F.2d 641 (7th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 949 (1971).
Second, the continued reexamination of a criminal matter undermines the necessary
finality in litigation. There is justification for the theory that collateral review should
not be used to relitigate issues already determined to be correct within acceptable toler-
ances. See Stone v. Powell, supra; J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 14-26 (1949); Jaffe,
Judicial Review: Constitutional and Jurisdictional Fact, 70 H.RV. L. REV. 953 (1957).
As one commentator has put it:
[lf a proceeding is held to determine the facts and law m a case, and the
processes used in that proceeding are fitted to the task in a manner not inferior
to those which would be used in a second proceeding, so that one cannot
demonstrate that relitigation would not merely consist of repetition and second-
guessing, why should not the first proceeding "count"? Why should we dupli-
cate effort?
lator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76
HARV. L. REV. 441, 451 (1963). Thus, the question becomes whether "the complex
of arrangements and processes which previously determined the facts and applied the
law validating detention" was adequate to its purpose. Id. at 449.
Third, the Court has stated that litigation beyond a direct appeal hampers efficient
allocation of judicial resources without offering a significant opportunity for legal devel-
opment. Stone v. Powell, supra at 3050 n.31. In Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174 (1947),
the Court noted:
Every error is potentially reversible error; and many rulings of the trial court
spell the difference between conviction and acquittal. If defendants who ac-
cept the judgment of conviction and do not appeal can later renew their
attack on the judgment by habeas corpus, litigation in these criminal cases
will be interminable.
Id. at 182. See also Friendly, supra at 148-49, cited in Stone v. Powell, supra at
3050 n.31:
Indeed, the most serious single evil with today's proliferation of collateral
attack is to drain upon the resources of the community-judges, prosecutors,
and attorneys appointed to aid the accused, and even of that oft overlooked
necessity, courtrooms. . . . The time of judges, prosecutors, and lawyers now
devoted to collateral attacks, most of them frivolous, would be much better
spent in trying cases.
Additionally, it has been argued that prolonged collateral review postpones incarcera-
tion of the guilty, Friendly, supra at 146-47, and implies that the trial court acted
improperly. See Stone v. Powell, supra at 3051 n.35; Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, supra
at 264-65 (Powell, J., concurring); Bator, supra at 451.
69. United States v. MacCollom, 96 S. Ct. 2086, 2091 (1976), citing Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 611 (1974), citing McKane
v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894).
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have no obligation to provide collateral relief.70  Nevertheless, the
Court would probably uphold a constitutional right to collateral review
if the trial and appeal were wholly inadequate to determine properly
innocence or guilt.71 Applying this standard to transcript cases, due
process would entitle an indigent to a free transcript to prosecute a
collateral attack only if he could make an unaided showing prior to a
hearing that the direct appeal process had broken down, depriving him
of a fair opportunity to present his claims. To reach this conclusion,
the Court seems to have adopted a balancing approach. The magnitude
of error required to trigger the constitutional right to collateral attack
is so great that a transcript would be necessary to prove it only in ex-
tremely unusual cases. 71 Policies favoring judicial economy, 73 finality,74
and the need to preserve trial court judgments7" outweigh the need for
unconditioned issuance of a free transcript in the vast majority of cases.
The Supreme Court had little difficulty upholding the section 753 (f)
frivolity regulations at issue in MacCollom because the statutory re-
quirement that an indigent demonstrate nonfrivolity as a condition
to issuance of a transcript 0 was far less stringent than the showing re-
quired by due process. 77 MacCollom's complaint satisfied neither
standard and he was therefore required to proceed without the benefit
of a free transcript.78
70. Cf. Friendly, supra note 68, at 164-66. Judge Friendly further notes that if
federal collateral review is seen as a means of providing a federal forum to determind
constitutional issues, then federal prisoners, who have such a forum on direct appeal,
ordinarily have no need for collateral review. Id.
71. Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 3050 n.31 (1976). See also Kaufman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 217, 235-36 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting); Friendly, supra
note 68, at 142.
72. See United States v. MacCollom, 96 S. Ct. 2086, 2093 (1976), quoting United
States v. Shoaf, 341 F.2d 832, 835 (4th Cir. 1964), discussed in notes 39 & 54 supra.
73. See note 68 supra.
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 3050 n.31 (1976).
76. See note 39 supra and accompanying text.
77. See notes 70-72 supra and accompanying text.
78. United States v. MacCollom, 96 S. Ct. 2086, 2092 (1976). There was some
concern among the dissenters that MacCollom's counsel, who was unwilling to have
a poor performance transcribed, heavily influenced him to forego a direct appeal.
Id. at 2097 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The majority disposed of this contention by
noting that any discussion between MacCollom and his counsel as to the desirability
of an appeal would not have been transcribed. Hence, a transcript would be of no
assistance in "flesh[ing] out" the claim. Id. at 2092. Cf. Friendly, supra note 68, at
152 n.6.
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The majority's failure to articulate fully either its view of equal pro-
tection or the basis of its disagreement with the principles underlying
Griffin may create constitutional anomalies. The Court chose to
distinguish Smith v. Bennett,79 which held it unconstitutional for a
state to condition the right to pursue a collateral attack upon the pay-
ment of a filing fee. Justice Rehnquist insisted that, unlike a filing
fee, restrictions on the right to a free transcript do not make it impossible
for an indigent to obtain collateral relief. 0 This explanation is un-
satisfactory. If due process or equal protection require a state to grant
all indigents access to collateral proceedings, surely the state must also
provide all services indispensable to such challenges."'
More seriously, the majority failed to consider cases such as Long
and Lane, which held that indigents appealing from adverse determina-
tions in habeas corpus and coram nobis proceedings are entitled to free
transcripts of those proceedings.82  Since both habeas corpus and
coram nobis are collateral attacks, these cases are only distinguishable
if there is a greater right to a transcript of a collateral proceeding for
use in a direct appeal from an unsuccessful collateral attack than to a
transcript of the initial trial for use in the original collateral attack.
Since a trial transcript will probably be more valuable in the latter
situation than a transcript of the collateral proceeding in the former, this
proposition is untenable.
Griffin and its progeny are built on a view of equal protection wholly
at odds with the Burger Court's concept of criminal justice. The Court
should have explicitly repudiated the Warren Court's equal protection
rationale rather than ignoring some relevant precedents and construct-
ing artificial distinctions in others.
As a practical matter, MacCollom may not yield any significant sav-
ing of judicial time. Because the Court is apparently willing to retain
79. 365 U.S. 708 (1961), discussed in notes 19-20 supra.
80. See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
81. If neither due process nor equal protection requires any collateral review, the
access-service distinction is irrelevant as applied to the states. At the federal level,
however, one form of collateral review, habeas corpus, has a constitutional foundation
independent of fifth amendment due process. Article I, section 9, prohibits congres-
sional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus except in time of national emergency,
but does not alone require the federal government to provide the services necessary
to make the writ effective. See United States v. MacCollom, 96 S. Ct. 2086, 2090-91
(1976). The access-service distinction may have some merit, therefore, applied to
indigent federal prisoners.
82. See notes 21-23 supra and accompanying text.
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the result in Griffin, 3 if not the rationale, MacCollom may encourage
indigent prisoners to pursue direct appeals in order to obtain transcripts
for later use. Thus, savings realized from reduction of the number of
transcripts issued to indigents pursuing collateral attacks may be offset
by a substantial increase in the number of free transcripts issued to
indigents pursuing direct appeals."' Finally, MacCollom may not
significantly reduce the number of transcripts that must be produced
for indigent collateral attacks, since the "particularized need," apparently
required by MacCollom,8 5 can be shown by careful drafting.80  The
MacCollom majority admitted that a transcript would have been issued
had the petitioner made stronger factual allegations.8 7
MacCollom reflects the Burger Court's restrictive view of equal
protection and the role of collateral review in the criminal justice
process.8 8 It remains to be seen whether the Court will explicitly adopt
83. See United States v. MacCollom, 96 S. Ct. 2086, 2091 (1976); Ross v. Moffitt,
417 U.S. 600, 614 (1974), discussed in notes 28-33 supra and accompanying text.
See also note 47 supra.
84. Approximately 75 percent of all criminal cases are currently appealed. See
United States v. MacCollom, 96 S. Ct. 2086, 2089 n.8 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
According to Justice Stevens, the appeal rate is more likely to increase than decrease.
Id.
85. See id. at 2092. Justice Blackmun, concurring separately, asserted that MacCol-
lorn was
required to show only that . . . there was a basis, grounded on some ar-
ticulable facts, for believing that a transcript would assist him in his § 2255
proceeding.
Id. at 2099 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis original).
86. See Huey v. North Carolina, 364 F. Supp. 447 (W.D.N.C. 1973):
The "need" standard was developed in order to prevent a petitioner's putting
the state to expense merely in order to allow him to "comb the record" (as
other appellants do) searching for previously unspecified errors. On the other
hand, the cases may have reduced the "need" standard to a merely formal
obstacle, which a sufficiently trained writer can usually hurdle by careful
phrasing.
87. United States v. MacCollom, 96 S. Ct. 2086, 2092 (1976).
It appears that some courts routinely issue free transcripts, a practice not proscribed
by MacCollom. See MacCollom v. United States, 511 F.2d 1116, 1123 (9th Cir.
1975), rev'd, 96 S. Ct. 2086 (1976), discussing Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S.
277, 279 n.1 (1964) (transcripts routinely issued in District Court for District of
Columbia if production cost is less than $200).
The current system of transcript production has come under strong attack. See Mayer
v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 200 n.1 (1971) (Burger, C.J., concurring). Prompt
legislative action to speed production of transcripts, a frequently suggested course, may
yield the only lasting solution. The American Bar Association urges that "[clontinuing
efforts should be exerted to improve techniques for the preparation of records . .. ."
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the trial-direct appeal/collateral review dichotomy implicit in Ross and
MacCollom, or explicitly recognize its subordination of equal protec-
tion to due process in criminal justice cases.
RELATING TO CRIMINAL APPEALS § 3.3(a). The ABA recommends that indigents be
provided transcripts at government expense for use in the direct or collateral appellate
process, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
STANDARDS REL4TING TO CRIMINAL APPEALS § 3.3(b). The National Advisory Commis-
sion on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals has recommended that courts take advan-
tage of technological developments to speed production of transcripts. Failing this, the
Commission has urged an immediate increase in the funds provided for transcript produc-
tion. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, COURTS
140-41 (1973).
88. See Stone v. Powell, 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412
U.S, 218, 250 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring). Several commentators have advocated
that the Court adopt this position. See Amsterdam, supra note 68; Bator, supra note 68;
Friendly, supra note 68; Oaks, Legal History in the High Court-Habeas Corpus, 64
MICH. L. REV. 451 (1966).
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